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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOL. III NOVEMBER, 1916 No. i
THE LEGAL STATUS OF JOINT STOCK
ASSOCIATIONS
A joint stock company is a type of business organization which
stands midway between the partnership, on the one hand, and the
corporation, on the other hand. In many instances. however, it is
to-day no easy matter to distinguish the unincorporated joint
stock company from the corporation, since by statutory enact-
ment many of the most characteristic capacities and attributes of
.corporations have been conferred upon joint stock associations.'
So true is this that a learned judge said recently that "the idea
that these companies occupy some undefined and undefinable
ground midway between a partnership and a corporation has prac-
tically faded away."'
At common law, however, a joint stock association was a
group of individuals organized for certain purposes into an asso-
ciation similar to a partnership, but, unlike a partnership, having
a capital stock divided into shares transferable by the owner.
3
Partners, the courts held, might associate themselves in a joint
stock company with transferable shares.' A joint stock associa-
tion in the early days was really simply a large partnership
possessing some of the characteristics and powers of the private
corporation.5 In fact, except to the extent that remedial legisla-
tion has altered the rule, joint stock associations are still subject
to the principles of law relating to common law co-partnerships.!
'Clark on Corps. (3d Ed. by Wormser) pp. 22-25. A to the difference
between the corporation and the partnership, see opinion of Cullen, Ch. J.
in Drucklieb v. Harris, 209 N. Y. 211, 216.
'O'Brien, I., in Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108.3Attorney General v. Mercantile Marine Ins. Co., 121 Mass. 524; Wells v.
Gates, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 554; People v. Coleman, 133 N. Y. 279, 31 N. E.
96; Hedge & Horn's Appeal. 63 Pa. St. 273.
'Lindley on Company Law, (6th Ed.) p. 193.
'People v. Rose, 219 Ill. 46, 76 N. E. 42.
'Hoadley v. Essex County Com'rs, 105 Mass. 519; Wells v. Gates, 18
Barb. (N. Y.) 554.
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The distinction between corporations and joint stock associa-
tions is not a mere academic one. The question is at times a
momentous one to answer. For example, joint stock companies
are not liable for taxes under a statute which imposes a tax upon
""corporations".7  In order to avoid this result, statutes are so
phrased to-day as to embrace within their purview both corpora-
tions and joint stock associations." The facility in doing business
is substantially the same in both forms of organizations and it is
this facility or advantage which it is the purpose of the taxing
statute to assess.9 Again, joint stock companies are exempt
from the effect of a constitutional provision requiring corporations
to be created only under general laws or requiring a two-thirds
vote of the State legislature for the creation of corporations. 0
Sometimes the legislature confers upon joint stock associations
so many attributes of a corporation that judges have differed as
to the legal status of the type of organization." In a recent case, 2
Judge O'Brien of the Court of Appeals of New York regarded
the Adams Express Company, which is a large joint stock asso-
citation, as a "quasi corporation", saying: "A joint stock associa-
tion, whatever else may be said about it, is certainly for most,
if not for all practical purposes, a legal entity capable in law of
acting and assuming legal obligations quite independent of the
shareholders." And, in the same case. Judge Hiscock said: "A
great association like the Adams Express Company is very unlike
an ordinary co-partnership and it has assumed for ordinary
practical purposes in its business and contractual relations, the
features and characteristics of a corporate creation, whereby the
joint aggregate entity has been made prominent, and the individual
units composing it have been overshadowed and obscured." On
the other hand, Judge E. T. Bartlett declared in the same case:
"It is unnecessary to point out in detail the very great difference
between the joint stock association and a corporation ;" and Judge
Werner said: "The company is concededlv not a corporation
although our statutes have invested it with certain corporate
attributes." The Federal courts regard corporations as citizens
'Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 566.
'Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U. S. 178, interpreting The Federal Corp. Tax
Law (Act Cong. Aug. 5, 1909, c. 6, sec. 38, 36 Stat. 112) ; Roberts v.
Anderson, 226 Fed. 7, 141 C. C. A. 121.
"Eliot v. Freeman, supra.
"Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 9; Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend.
(N. Y.) 103.
'Clark on Corps. (3d Ed. by Wormser) pp. 24-25.
' Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108.
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under Article III, sec. 2, of the Constitution of the United States,
conferring jurisdiction upon the Federal courts over controversies
between citizens of different States.13 They refuse, however, to
regard joint stock companies as citizens for purposes of federal
jurisdiction. 4 Where the bill alleged that the Adams Express
Company was a joint stock companv duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of New York and a citizen of that
State, and that the defendant was a citizen of the State of Missouri,
the Federal Court in a recent case directed that the suit be dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction, saying: "The averment that the
complainant is a joint stock company, is not equivalent to the
statement that it is a corporation."' 5
If the legislature confers upon an association all the essential
attributes of the corporate body, it thereby creates it a corpora-
tion and it would seem immaterial that the term "corporation" is
not used."' If the legislature declares that the association shall not
be a corporation, no matter how conclusive this may be in the
domestic jurisdiction, it does not bind foreign jurisdictions or pre-
vent their courts from inquiring into the true .character of the
association whenever that may come in issue.17 Its attributes, as
well as the intention of the domestic legislature, determine its
status abroad.' 8
Formation.-Joint stock companies unlike corporations may
be formed by a mere agreement of association among the members.
A joint stock company with transferable shares is valid at com-
mon law, and will not be held illegal unless it can be shown to
be of a dangerous character.'9 To-day, joint stock companies fre-
quently derive from a statutory source further qualities or ben-
efits not existing at common law. Such statutory authority is not
at all essential, however, to the existence of the joint stock com-
pany, which is absolutely legal at common law. The statutory
"Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. (U. S.) 497; Marshall v. Balti-
more R. Co., 16 How. (U. S.) 314; Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579.
"Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449; Thomas
v. Board of Trustees, 195 U. S. 207; Gregg v. Sanford, 65 Fed. 151, 12
C. C. A. 525; Rountree v. Adams Express Co,, 165 Fed. 152, 91 C. C. A. 186.
'Rountree v. Adams Express Co., supra.
"Clark on Corporations, (3d. Ed. by Wormser) p. 15.
"Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 566.
'Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra; Edwards v. Warren Lino-
line & Gasoline Works, 168 Mass. 564, 47 N. E. 502; Tide Water Pipe Co.
v. Assessors, 57 N. J. L. 576, 31 AtI. 220.
"Roberts v. Anderson, 226 Fed. 7, 141 C. C. A. 121. And see, Lindley
on Company Law (6th Ed.) p. 193 et seq.
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authority simply confers rights and privileges which no unin-
corporated association as such enjoys at common law.20
Dissolution.-A partnership may be dissolved at any time
without the consent of the state and the same rule applies to joint
stock companies except in so far as it may be modified by statute. 2'
In this respect joint stock companies differ from corporations.
Continuity of Existence.-The element of delectus persona,
is characteristic of a partnership, and the death of a partner or
the transfer of his interest ipso facto dissolves the partnership.
'The precise opposite is true in the case of a corporation, which is
unaffected by the death of a stockholder or the transfer of his
shares. In thi respect, the joint stock company resembles the
corporation rather than the partnership, since the demise or
withdrawal of an associate in a joint stock company does not dis-
solve it. 2 2 However, the right to transfer shares in a partner-
ship business may by agreement be incorporated even into
partnership articles.
Common Name.-Like corporations, joint stock companies
are known by a common name. This does not make the body a
corporation and, as is well known, partnerships are often com-
monly known by a trade name under which they carry on their
business. 23
Agency.-Each partner is an agent of the firm. On the other
hand, a stockholder in a corporation is not an agent of the corpo-
ration, which acts through its duly constituted board of directors
and officers. In this respect, again, a joint stock company re-
sembles a corporation. Joint stock companies conduct their busi-
ness through their boards of trustees or directors; their members
as such, have no power to bind them. This circumstance of re-
semblance does not make a joint stock association a corporation.24
Contracts.-Each and every member of a joint stock company
is liable upon the contracts entered into by it.2 5  Under some
statutes an action may even be brought in the first instance against
:'Roberts v. Anderson, supra.
'Mann v. Butler, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 362.
"Gleason v. McKay, 134 Mass. 419; Hibbs v. Brown, supra.
'Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 103.
2
"Warner v. Beers, supra.
2Tappan v. Bailey, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 529; Kingsland v. Braisted, 2 Lans.
(N. Y.) 17.
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the individual members of the association.20 It is more generally
provided, however, that an action cannot be brought against the
individual members of the joint stock association until after judg-
ment and execution unsatisfied against the association.2 7  In this
regard, a joint stock association is more similar to a partnership
than to a corporation, since the contracts of a corporation are the
contracts of the legal entity, and of it alone, and are not in any
sense, the contracts of the individual members of the corpora-
tion.28 .
Acquisition and Transfer of Property.-Except as modified
by statute, a joint stock company, unlike a corporation, cannot
acquire and convey property by its common name. Title must
be taken and conveyed by the members as individuals. Property
may also be taken and conveyed by an officer in trust for the
members.29 It is not necessary that an unincorporated association
should have statutory authorization to have its real estate held
by its president (or other officer) as a trustee for its members.30
Indeed, in a case decided recently by the Supreme Court of the
United States, the property of an unincorporated joint stock com-
pany was held by trustees, and it was conceded by the court that
its right in this regard was not derived from any statute.31
Actions.-In the case of the joint stock company, the rule at
common law is that it cannot sue or be sued in the name of the
association or of its officers, but must sue or be sued in the name
of all of the members composing it, however numerous they may
be. All are necessary parties at the common law.32 The hardship
and inconvenience of making all the members of large unincorpo-
rated associations parties to actions soon led to important remedial
legislation both in England and in this country.33 This legislation
'See opinion of Hiscock, J., in Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. F.
1108.
'Hibbs v. Brown, supra.
'Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 519, at p. 587; Erickson v.
Revere Elevator Co., 110 Minn. 443. 126 N. W. 130.
"Pratt v. California Min. Co., 24 Fed. 869; Byam v. Bickford, 140 Mass.
31.
"Roberts v. Anderson, 225 Fed. 7, 141 C. C. A. 121.
"
1Eliot V. Freeman, 220 U. S. 178.
'Roberts'v. Anderson. supra; Van Aernam v. Bleistein, 102 N. Y. 355;
Hybart v. Parker, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 209.
'See, Roberts v. Anderson, supra. In New York, the Act of 1849
authorized joint stock companies to sue and be sued in the name of the
president or treasurer. This was followed by similar legislation. The
provisions are still in force, being included in the Joint Stock Association
Law (Consol. Law. c. 29). See, also. Constitution of New York, Article
VIII, sec. 3.
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provides that such associations may sue and be sued in the name
of a designated officer, as, for example, the president or treasurer
of the company. This officer, for the purposes of suit, is regarded
substantially as the company, as distinct from the individuals
composing it. Such statutes, however, do not make joint stock
associations, corporations. 31 On the other hand, if all other corpo-
rate attributes are conferred upon the association, the mere fact
that it sues and is sued in the name of an officer rather than in
its artificial name should not be held to prevent the courts from
treating the company as a corporation. The result is, in effect,
the same, for process would have to be served on some officer even
if the suit were brought in the artificial name.35 It must be noted
that suits may never be brought by or against a joint stock com-
pany in its artificial name unless this is expressly authorized by
statute. 36
Actions by Members Against Joint Stock Associations.-A
corporation may sue its stockholders or be sued by them, and
under some statutes it is held that a joint stock company is so
similar to a corporation that an action may be brought by a
member against the officer designated by statute as the representa-
tive of the association, and vice versa. 7 The Constitution of New
York (Article VIII, sec. 3.) expressly provides that the term
"corporation" shall include joint stock companies and, accordingly,
joint stock companies have the right to sue, and are subject to be
sued, in all cases just like corporations. Under provisions of this
nature it is plain that joint stock companies for most practical
purposes are constituted corporations.3 8 There is a clear recogni-
tion of the joint stock association as an entity recognized by the
law as something quite distinct and separate from its individual
members.
Transfer of Shares.-The capital of a joint stock company
unlike that of a partnership, but like that of a corporation, is
divided into shares which are apportioned among the members in
proportion to the respective amounts which they have dedicated to
'People v. Coleman, 133 Mass. 279, 31 N. E. 96; Van Aernam v. Blei-
stein, 102 N. Y. 355.
'Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wail. (U. S.) 566.
'Van Aernam v. Bleistein, supra.
'Hibbs v. Brown, supra, opinion of Hiscock, 1., citing Code Civ. Proc.
secs. 1919-1924.
'Hibbs v. Brown, supra.
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the common enterprise. These shares are assignable by their
owners like shares of corporate stock. The right to transfer
shares in a partnership business may by agreement be inserted into
articles of co-partnership, however, and, it follows that this
attribute of transferability of shares does not make a joint stock
association, a corporation."  In the case of certain types of joint
stock companies, e. g., the Pennsylvania "partnership association,"
the transferee will not become an associate unless the consent of
the other members is given, either antecedently in the articles of
association, or at the time of the transfer, or subsequently."
Individual Liability of Members.-Unless it is -provided to
the contrary by statute, or by a provision in the articles of associa-
tion which has been brought to the attention of creditors, the asso-
ciates in a joint stock company are personally liable for its debts. 41
The stockhold&rs in a corporation are not liable for the debts of
the corporation; the debts are regarded as those of the corporate
entity and of it alone. On the other hand, partners are liable for
the debts of a partnership. Joint stock companies have neverthe-
less sometimes been regarded as corporations for all practical pur-
poses even though their members do not possess the important
corporate attribute of limited liability.4 2 Even corporations may
exist, under charter or statutory provision, where the members
do not enjoy a restricted liability, without making the association
any the less a corporation. It was recently held that under the
constitution and laws of the State of New York, the United
States Express Company, a joint stock association, was "for all
practical purposes a corporation," even though its individual asso-
ciates were liable for the debts of the company. 43 The statutes
and constitution endowed joint stock associations with so many
corporate characteristics, and with so many capacities and attri-
butes not in possession of a partnership at common law, that the
decision was quite correct. On the other hand, the common law
liability on the part of members of joint stock associations may be
removed by statute, or by provision brought home to the notice
'Gleason v. McKay, 134 Mass. 419; Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N. Y.)
103.
"Edwards v. Warren Linoline & Gasoline Works, 168 Mass. 564, 47
N. E. 502; Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. St. 315; Eliot v. Himrod, 108 Pa. St.
569.
"Pettis v. Atkins, 60 Ill. 454; Wells 'v. Gates, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 554;
Kingsland v. Braisted, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 17; Frost v. Walker, 60 Me. 468."
"Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108.
'
3Hibbs v. Brown, supra, opinions of Hiscock, J., and O'Brien, J.
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of creditors, without thereby creating the association a corpora-
tion.
44
The distinction between corporations and joint stock com-
panies with regard to individual liability would seem to be that
stockholders in a corporation are not liable for its debts unless
they are expressly made liable by statute; whereas, on the other
hand, the associates in a joint stock association are individually
liable for its debts unless this liability is expressly removed by
statutory enactment or by agreement brought home to the notice
of creditors. The creation of a corporation, so to speak, drowns
out the individual liability of the members, whereas the creation of
a joint stock association has not this inherent effect unless so
provided by express affirmative enactment or stipulation."5 Indi-
vidual liability for debts is, however, not a positive criterion
whereby to distinguish corporations from joint stock associations
since, as has been seen, the principle of stockholders' personal
liabilit y is not at all inconsistent with the fact of corporate
existence.46
Merger of Associates Into Artificial Personality.-We have
seen that a joint stock company is not a corporation simply because
it is authorized by the state, or because its shares are transferable,
or because it has an artificial name, or even because its associates
may not be personally liable for its debts. It has been suggested
that the distinguishing mark between a joint stock company and a
corporation is whether the association exists as a legal entity
distinct and separate from the associates as individual persons;
if there is such separate entity and artificial personality, then
the body is a corporation, otherwise it is a joint stock company.4
The difficulty with this is that it is begging the question to assert
that the body is a corporation if it be a legal entity, since in order
to determine whether the body is a legal entity, it is first necessary
to consider the legislative intent and the attributes conferred upon
the body.
In a well known New York case,48 Judge Finch suggested that
the distinction is "that the creation of the corporation merges in
"Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 103. See, also, Andrews Bros.
Co. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 Fed. 585, 30 C C. A 293. The authority
of the last cited case is shaken, if in fact the decision is not overruled, in
Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449.
'People v. Coleman, 133 N. Y. 279, 31 N. E. 96.
'And, see, Clark on Corporations (3d Ed. by Wormser) pp. 20, 24.
"'Andrews Bros. Co. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 Fed. 585, 30 C. C. A.
293, opinion per Lurton, I.
-"People v. Coleman, 133 N. Y. 279, 31 N. E. 96.
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the artificial body and drowns in it the individual rights and lia-
bilities of the members, while the organization of a joint stock
company leaves the individual rights and liabilities unimpaired
and in full force," This suggestion is not satisfactory, for associa-
tions have frequently been held by the courts to be corporations
even though the members are by charter made individually liable
for the debts of the body. The principle of stockholders' personal
liability is not necessarily inconsistent with the fact of corporate
existence,4 9 and as said by Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the
Supreme Court of the United States, "it is quite certain that the
principle of personal liability of the shareholders attaches to a
very large proportion of the corporations of this country and it
is a principle which has warm advocates for its universal applica-
tion when the organization is for pecuniary gain."50  The Court
of Appeals of this State, however, has never altogether abandoned
its position that .the distinguishing feature of the joint stock asso-
ciation, as contrasted with the corporation, is the personal liability
of its members; and, indeed, this feature of pe'rsonal liability
has been regarded by some members of the court as so co-existent
with the life of the joint stock association that it cannot be abro-
gated by the contract of the parties in interest.,"
Conclusion.-The truth is, in fine, that the modern joint stock
association, as the result bf statute, is so frequently endowed with
most of the familiar attributes of the private corporation that
to-day it is a matter of the greatest difficulty in many instances
to determine precisely where the legal domain occupied by joint
stock associations begins and ends. The so-called "partnership
association" of the State of Pennsylvania is recognized in that
State as a body quite distinct from a corporation,5" and it is so
treated in some of the States, for example, in Massachusetts.53
On the other hand, other States regard it as a corporation, insisting
that the essential attributes of the body are those of a corporate
entity and that, therefore, it is a corporation. 54 These latter States
insist that the true test is not so much what the legislature intended
"°See note 46, supra.
'Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 566.
"Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108, opinions of Cullen, Ch.
J., Edward T. Bartlett, I. and Werner I.
:'Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. St. 315; Eliot v. Himrod, 108 Pa. St. 569.
'Edwards v. Warren Linoline & Gasoline Works, 168 Mass. 564, 47 N. R.
502.
"Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Assessors, 57 N. J. L. 516, 31 AtI. 220; Edge-
worth v. Wood, 58 N. J. L. 463, 33 Atl. 940.
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to do as what the legislature has really done, and that a legislature
actually can create a corporation although not intending to do so.5
The difficulty is that oftentimes the legislature has not clearly
in mind exactly what it intends to do, with the result that the
courts are burdened with questions of statutory interpretation and
construction which are as tantalizing as they are unnecessary.
The problem should be squarely confronted. The statutes of the
different States, particularly New York and Pennsylvania, on the
subject of joint stock associations should be redrafted so as to
define more precisely the legal status of the bodies created there-
under. 'This course would at least do away with the absurdity of
the present situation, when no two judges of the self-same court
are even agreed upon what a joint stock association is in the eye of
the law."8 The only alternative to this suggested legislative draft-
ing of a scientific statute is to do away entirely hereafter with the
joint stock association as a type of business organization, and to
confine trading groups to the partnership and the corporation.
This would have the positive merit of drawing a horizontal line
across the list of trading groups, confining corporations to its
lower side and partnerships to its upper side, and thereby eliminat-
ing the illogical and confusing twilight zone which the writer has
sought to outline in this paper. 1. MAURICE WORMSER.
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY ScnoOL OF LAW.
New York, N. Y.
'See, Clark on Corps. (3d Ed. by Wormser) p. 14 et seq.
'Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108.
